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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model in which the learning behavior of agents
generates fluctuations in money demand and possibly causes a prolonged de-
pression. We consider a stochastic Money-in-Utility model, where agents re-
ceive utility from holding money only when a liquidity shock (e.g., a bank run)
occurs. Households update the subjective probability of the shock based on
the observation and change their money demand accordingly. In this setting,
we first derive a stationary cycles under perfect price adjustment, which is
characterized by periods of gradual inflation and sudden sporadic falls of the
price level. When the nominal stickiness is introduced, the liquidity shock is
followed by a period of low output. We show that the adverse eﬀects of the
shocks are largest when they occur in succession in an economy which has
enjoyed a long period of stability.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a simple model in which the learning behavior of agents generates
fluctuations in money demand and possibly causes a prolonged depression. It is
commonly assumed in monetary macroeconomics models–both in money-in-utility
models and cash-in-advance models–that the benefit from holding money is well
known beforehand. However, we sometimes find ourselves not very sure about how
much money will be needed but hold some just for precaution. For concreteness,
suppose that we can do business using checks at normal times, but once some shock to
the financial system (e.g., a bank run) occurs transactions cannot be settled without
money. We do not know exactly when bank runs occur. Moreover, we do not know
the precise probability that bank runs occur but have to learn from past history.
In such a situation, the learning process will cause the money demand to fluctuate,
which in turn aﬀect other macroeconomic variables especially when prices are not
fully flexible.
To examine this information-driven fluctuation, we introduce a stochastic version
of Sidrauski’s (1967) model: agents receive utility from holding money only when a
liquidity shock occurs. In the model, the shock is generated by a Markov modulated
Poisson process (MMPP), which means that shock follows a usual Poisson process,
and the arrival rate changes unobservably between high (a dangerous state) and low
(a safer state) according to a Markov Process. We show that if the shock does not
occur for a while, agents gradually increase the belief of being in a safer state, reduce
the shock probability, and lower money demand, causing inflation. Conversely, when
they observe the shock, they strengthen the belief that they are in a dangerous state,
increase their subjective probability for meeting with the shock again, and raise
money demand, causing deflation.
An important finding is that the impact of a liquidity shock on the economy
depends on the economy’s history before encountering it. In a “turbulent” economy
that is hit regularly by shocks, an additional shock actually has little impact on
the economy because it has only minor eﬀect on the belief about the fundamental
state of the economy. By contrast, in a “stable” economy where shocks were rarely
observed until recently, an occurrence of a shock has a significant eﬀect on their
belief (Intuitively, it is a surprise to agents). Still, if there are no more shocks to
follow, the macroeconomic eﬀect is limited since agents see the one-shot shock as a
mare accident. However, if they observe a succession of shocks in a previously stable
economy, they will completely change their belief about the fundamental state of the
economy, as experienced in Japan in mid 1990s, and possibly as in the U.S. in late
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2000s. As agents become quickly pessimistic, the aggregate money demand jumps
up, which can a cause depression if the prices are not fully flexible. Moreover, as
in the case of Japan, the recovery from the depression is shown to take a long time
when the agents’ pessimistic belief is so strong that it is not easily turned over by
the gradually revealed information that no shock occurs.
There exist a number of earlier studies that analyzed the macroeconomic move-
ments when an underlying state is only partially observable and information is re-
vealed gradually (e.g., Caplin and Leahy 1993; Zeira 1994; Boldrin and Levine 2001;
and Andolfatto and Gomme 2003). In particular, Chalkley and Lee (1998) con-
sidered unobservable changes in investment opportunities and showed that recovery
from a recession is protracted when risk aversion of agents prevents them from acting
promptly on receiving good news. Potter (2000) and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2006) explained slow recovery generated by an endogenous flow of information.
If agents have a pessimistic belief, their activities are low, generating less public
information, and therefore good news is only slowly revealed. These studies are
complementary to this paper in providing alternative explanations of slow recovery,1
but they do not show that negative shocks have the largest eﬀect when the shocks
hit an economy that was previously in good condition for a long time. This paper
is also related to Farzin, Huisman and Kort (1998), Hassett and Metcalf (1999),
Venegas-Mart´ınes (2001), and Wa¨lde (1999, 2005) in that the analysis includes a
continuous-time stochastic optimization with discrete jumps in a state variable, al-
though these studies consider the case in which agents know the true arrival rate of
jumps.2
The organization of the paper is as follows. After introducing a stochastic Money-
in-Utility model in Section 2, we describe the process of the liquidity shock and the
evolution of the belief that is updated based on Bayes’ law in section 3. Section 4
presents a benchmark result for the case where the price level is perfectly flexible,
1In our model, the recovery is slow not because information is scarce in depression but people’s
strong beliefs dwarf the significance of new, favorable information. In fact, the flow of information
brought by no occurrence of the shock is largest when people are convinced of being in the dangerous
state. However, it is also the time when their prior belief is strongest, and hence people only slowly
change it.
2Technically speaking, the substantial diﬀerences are in that our model have multiple state vari-
ables and that the size of jump is not exogenously random but determined by the rational learning
behavior. It is shown that, in our case, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations yields a
system of partial delay diﬀerential equations (sometimes called diﬀerence-diﬀerential equations).
We develop a numerical procedure to solve this problem via iteration without linearization. A set
of Mathematica codes are available upon request.
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and shows the pattern of price movements. The nominal stickiness is introduced
in Section 5 to investigate how a depression is triggered and how economy recovers
from it. Section 6 concludes the paper. Some mathematical proofs are collated in
Appendix.
2 A Stochastic Money-in-Utility Model
This section sets up a stochastic Money-in-Utility model, where money holdings af-
fect utility only at random discrete points in time. In the model, time is continuous,3
and the economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived homogeneous house-
holds with measure one. At each date, they gain utility u(ct) from consumption
ct, where instantaneous felicity function u(·) is twice diﬀerentiable, u0(·) > 0, and
satisfies the Inada conditions. In addition, when a liquidity shock occurs, they expe-
rience utility loss v(mt) < 0 according to their real money holding mt. We assume
v0(m) > 0, which means that the size of utility loss is small when their real money
holdings are large. Function v(·) also satisfies v00(m) < 0, limm→0mv0(m) > 0, and
limm→∞ v0(m) = 0. Their expected utility EUt is therefore given by
EUt = Et
⎡
⎣
Z ∞
t
u(cτ )e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ +
X
τ∈S(t,∞)
v(mτ )e
−ρ(τ−t)
⎤
⎦ , (1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and S(t,∞) is the set of future dates at which
the shock occurs. Note that the shock dates S(t,∞) are stochastic and cannot be
exactly anticipated in advance. Therefore, households are willing to hold money at
all times for precaution.
We keep the remaining settings as simple as possible. Each household is endowed
with one unit of labor at each point time, which is suppled to the labor market
inelastically. A representative firm employs nt units of labor and competitively pro-
duces ynt units of goods, where y > 0 is a constant technology parameter and nt
is labor input. Note that, as long as prices are perfectly flexible, nt = 1 holds and
the output will be y. The monetary authority issues a constant amount of nominal
money stock, the size of which is normalized to one.4 Goods are perishable and thus
cannot be stored. The households will not borrow or lend among themselves because
3We use a continuous time model in order to highlight the diﬀerence between the change in
belief when bad news arrives and when there is no such news. This strategy is similar to Driﬃll
and Miller (1993) and Zeira (1999), but in their models uncertainty eventually vanishes and the
economy reaches a steady state since unobservable state is time invariant.
4This assumption is made only for the simplicity of the description of the model and notations.
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they are identical. The firm has no value because of its linear production technology
and perfect competition. Therefore, money is the only asset in this economy.
Let pt denote the price of consumption good. Since firms are competitive, the
nominal wage rate is given by the nominal marginal product pty. Then, the nominal
money holding of the household evolves according to
M˙t = ptynt − ptct. (2)
The objective of the representative household is to maximize expected utility (1)
under budget constraint (2). To solve this problem, they need two sorts of additional
information. One is the likelihood of encountering a shock in the future, because it
determines the expected benefit of holding money. The next section explains how
household estimate and update the likelihood through Bayesian learning. The other
required information is the inflation rate, because it determines the real cost of
holding money. We later investigate how the evolution pattern of the inflation rate
is determined in the market, both for the case of perfectly flexible prices (Section 4)
and for the case of sticky prices (Section 5).
3 Learning Process
There are two underlying states with diﬀerent probabilities of the shock, called states
H and L. In state i ∈ {H,L}, the shock occurs with probability θi per unit of time,
where θH > θL > 0. The household cannot directly observe the current state but
knows that the state evolves according to a Markov process: state H changes to state
L with Poisson probability pH per unit of time whereas state L changes to state H
with probability pL. We assume that the shock occurs much more frequently in state
H than in state L and that the state change is a rare event when compared to the
shock in state H. Formally,
Assumption 1 θH − θL > pH + pL.
By observing whether the shock occurs or not the household continuously revises
its subjective shock probability in a Bayesian manner. Let θt ∈ {θH , θL} denote the
true shock probability at time t, which is unknown to the household. Using infor-
mation available up to time t, it forms a belief that current θt is θH with probability
The results to follow are essentially the same even when the nominal money growth rate is positive
and constant. In that case the price level would not be stationary, and therefore we need to
normalize the price level by by dividing by the nominal money supply.
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λHt and θL with probability λLt . Obviously,
λLt + λ
H
t = 1 for all t. (3)
In order to find how the household updates λit from t to t + ∆t,5 we first ob-
tain the subjective probability that the shock does not occur between t and t +∆t
for given λit. It is denoted by Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅
¤
, where Probt[·] is a probability
operator based on information available at t, S(a,b] is the set of dates on which the
shock actually occurs during (a, b], and ∅ the empty set. Since the underlying state
is either H or L at time t + ∆t, this probability is divided into two components,
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θH
¤
and Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θL
¤
.
Each of the two components is further divided into two probabilities. The former
is the sum of the probability that ‘the state is H at time t and neither the state change
nor the shock occurs during the interval’ and the probability that ‘the present state
is L and the state changes to H during the interval.’ It is6
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θH
¤
=
¡
1− (θH + pH)∆t
¢
λHt + (p
L∆t)λLt . (4)
Similarly, the latter is
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θL
¤
=
¡
1− (θL + pL)∆t
¢
λLt + (p
H∆t)λHt . (5)
Summing up (4) and (5) yields
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅
¤
= 1− θet∆t, (6)
where θet represents the expected (or subjective) probability of the shock per unit of
time at time t,
θet ≡ θHλHt + θLλLt . (7)
Let us consider how the representative household updates its belief if it eventually
finds that the shock did not occur during (t, t + ∆t]. In this case the information
that S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ is added to its knowledge. Thus, using Bayes’ law we find updated
subjective probability λit+∆t to be
λit+∆t ≡ Probt+∆t
£
θt+∆t = θi
¤
= Probt
£
θt+∆t = θi|S(t,t+∆t] = ∅
¤
=
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θi
¤
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] = ∅
¤ .
5Time interval ∆t is taken to be so short that the probability that the liquidity shock and a
state change coexist in the interval is negligible.
6Throughout the paper we ignore the second-order term of ∆t and higher because ∆t→ 0.
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Since the numerator is given by (4) or (5) and the denominator by (6), λHt+∆t equals
7
λHt+∆t =
¡
1− (θH + pH)∆t
¢
λHt + (pL∆t)λLt
1− θet∆t
.
From this equation we derive the time derivative of λHt as
λ˙Ht = lim∆t→0
λHt+∆t − λHt
∆t
= (θet − θH − pH)λHt + pLλLt . (8)
We next consider the case where the shock occurs during (t, t+∆t]. Since
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] 6= ∅ ∩ θt+∆t = θi
¤
= θiλit∆t for i ∈ {L,H}, (9)
the probability that the shock occurs is
Probt
£
S(t,t+∆t] 6= ∅
¤
=
¡
θHλHt + θ
LλLt
¢
∆t = θet∆t, (10)
which is consistent with (6). From Bayes’ law dividing (9) by (10) gives the updated
subjective probability that θt+∆t = θi under the condition that the shock occurs
during (t, t+∆t]. It is
λit = lim
t0→t−
θiλit0
θet0
≡ θ
iλit−
θet−
, (11)
where subscript t− represents the state just before t.8 Finally, we obtain the dynam-
ics of subjective probability θet . From (3) and (7),
λHt =
θet − θL
θH − θL , λ
L
t =
θH − θet
θH − θL . (12)
Substituting (8) and (12) into the time derivative of (7) yields the time derivative of
θet in the case where the shock does not occur at time t,
θ˙et = (θ
e
t − θL − pL)(θet − θH − pH)− pLpH ≡ g(θet ) for t /∈ S(0,∞). (13)
Under Assumption 1, function g(θet ) has a U-shape, as illustrated in Figure 1(a).
This function satisfies
g(θ) Q 0⇐⇒ θ R θ∗ for any θ ∈
£
θL, θH
¤
, where
θ∗ ≡ θ
L + θH + pL + pH −
p
(θH + pH − θL − pL)2 + 4pLpH
2
∈ (θL, θH). (14)
7λLt+∆t is analogously obtained. From (3) it equals 1− λHt+∆t.
8Mathematically, θt− is the limit of θτ as τ approaches t from the left. θt− is diﬀerent from θt
when belief of the household changes discretely at time t. Similar notations are used, for example,
in a textbook by Dockner et al. (2000, Chapter 8).
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(a) During the period without a shock (b) When the shock is observed
Figure 1: Movement of belief through Bayesian learning
Similarly, by substituting (11) and (12) into (7) we obtain the value of θet as a
function of θet− in the case where a shock does occur at time t.
θet = θ
L + θH − θ
LθH
θet−
≡ h(θet−) for t ∈ S(0,∞). (15)
As shown in Figure 1(b), function h(θ) satisfies
h(θH) = θH , and θe < h(θe) < θH for all θe ∈ (θL, θH).
Equations (15) and (13) respectively describe the dynamics of θet with and without
the shock. They jointly show that θet fluctuates within interval
¡
θ∗, θH
¤
. The liquidity
shock is a rare event, and therefore causes a discrete change in people’s expectation
about the present state once it occurs. As function h(θe) is located above the 45-
degree line in Figure 2, the more often people observe the shock, the more strongly
they believe that they are in state H, and hence θet becomes closer to θH .
Conversely, in the absence of the shock people gradually become more and more
optimistic and confident that the economy is in state L. Thus, their subjective prob-
ability of the shock gradually declines, converging to θ∗.9 However, the U-shape of
function g(θet ) implies that the speed of adjusting belief is slow when θet is near θH .
Note that θet ≈ θH is equivalent to λHt ≈ 1 from (12), which means that the precision
9θet never becomes lower than θ∗(> θL) since people take into account the possibility that state
L might have changed to state H even though the shock does not occur.
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of the prior belief is quite high (i.e., people are quite sure that the current state is
H). In that case any additional information has only a small impact on the posterior
belief.
4 Information Cycles under Perfectly Flexible Prices
Let us examine how the market price evolves when households update their belief
in the way explained in the previous section. In this section, we assume that price
level pt can be adjusted instantly so that nt = 1 holds for all t. Note that there is no
steady state in equilibrium at which the price level stays constant for all t because
the decisions of household depend on θet , which is not constant. Thus, we instead
search for a stationary relationship between θet and pt. Specifically, we search for a
function p(·) that satisfies10
pt = p(θet ) for all t. (16)
Since we are interested in a monetary equilibrium path in which money has a positive
value, we limit our attention to the path of equilibrium price that become neither
zero or infinity:11
Assumption 2 p(θe) ∈ (0,∞) for all θe ∈ (θ∗, θH).
If the price level is a function of θet holds, the inflation rate can also be written as a
function of θet . From (16) and (13),
πt ≡ p˙t/pt =
p0(θet )
p(θet )
g(θet ) ≡ π(θet ) for t /∈ S(0,∞). (17)
However, recall that the belief θet jumps when a shock is observed. In that case, pt
may also jump. The following gives the ratio of the price level between before and
after the shock.
Πt ≡ pt/pt− =
p(h(θet ))
p(θet )
≡ Π(θet ) for t ∈ S(0,∞). (18)
10This approach is similar to Lucas (1978).
11To see why this assumption is reasonable, suppose that pt0 =∞ for some date t0, which means
that money has no value at t0. Then, it follows that pt = ∞ for all t ≥ t0 since otherwise an
arbitrage opportunity arises: consumers can obtain an arbitrary amount of money at date t0 at
no cost and then sell money (i.e., purchase goods) at a date in which pt is finite to increase their
expected utility. Since θet evolves within (θ∗, θH) recurrently, (16) implies that if p(θ∞) = ∞ for
some θ∞ ∈ (θ∗, θH) then p(θe) =∞ for all θe ∈ (θ∗, θH). That is, if there is such θ∞, then pt =∞
for all t and therefore money is never demanded. We also rule out the possibility that p(θe) = 0 for
some θe ∈ (θ∗, θH) because the value of consumption good never becomes zero from u0(·) > 0.
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Our task is to find a function p(θet ) (and therefore also π(θet ) and Π(θet )) such that,
given these, the household’s optimization leads to the clearance of all markets. In the
following, we will proceed in three steps: (i) We consider a dynamic programming
problem and obtain a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, given π(θet ) and
Π(θet ). (ii) We obtain the Euler equation from the first order and envelope conditions
of the HJB equation. (iii) We substitute the equilibrium conditions to the Euler
equation and examine the properties that must be satisfied by function p(θet ).
When the inflation rate follows (17)-(18) and nt = 1 holds, budget constraint (2)
can be written as
m˙t = y − π(θet )mt − ct for t /∈ S(0,∞), (19)
mt = mt−/Π(θet ) for t ∈ S(0,∞). (20)
The household maximizes the expected utility (1) subject to (19) and (20), and also
to the law of motion of thier belief (13) and (15). Let U(θe,m) denote the maximized
value when the current belief and real money holding are θe and m. By considering
a small time interval ∆t, the Bellman equation for this problem can be written as
U(θe, m) = max
c
h
u(c)∆t+ (θe∆t)v(m00)
+
1
1 + ρ∆t
©
(1− θe∆t)U(θe0,m0) + (θe∆t)U(h(θ),m00)
ªi
,
(21)
where θe0 = θe+g(θe)∆t, m0 = m+(y−π(θe)m−c)∆t, and m00 = m/Π(θe). Observe
that with probability 1− θe∆t there is no shock and the state changes from (θe, m)
to (θe0,m0), whereas with probability θe∆t there is a shock and the state changes to
(h(θe),m00). Taking the limit ∆t → 0 in (21) yields the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation for the problem:
ρU(θe,m) = max
c
h
u(c) + θe
¡
v(m/Π(θe)) + U(h(θe),m/Π(θe))− U(θe, m)
¢
+ g(θe)Uθ(θe, m) +
¡
y − π(θe)m− c
¢
Um(θe,m)
i
.
(22)
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of (22) with respect to c gives the first order
condition
u0(ec) = Um(θe, m), (23)
where ec denotes the optimal amount of consumption. Since θet and mt evolves ac-
cording to (13) and (19) during the period of no shock, equation (23) shows that the
movement of consumption is characterized by
d
dt
u0(ect) = g(θet )Umθ + ¡y − π(θe)m− ec¢Umm for t /∈ S(0,∞), (24)
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abbreviating the arguments for U(·, ·) functions when they are (θe,m). From the
envelope theorem, (22) can be diﬀerentiated with respect to m at c = ec to give
(ρ+ π(θe) + θe)Um =g(θe)Uθm +
¡
y − π(θe)m− ec¢Umm
+ θeΠ(θe)−1
¡
v0(m/Π(θe) + Um(h(θe),m/Π(θe))
¢
.
(25)
By substituting (23) and (24) for (25), we can eliminate the value function from it
to obtain the Euler equation,
d
dt
u0(ect) = (ρ+ π(θe) + θe)u0(ect)− θe v0(mt/Π(θe)) + u0(ec00t )Π(θe) for t /∈ S(0,∞), (26)
where ec00t represents the optimal amount of consumption when a shock is observed
and the state changes to (h(θet ), m/Π(θet )).
Since all households are symmetric, the equilibrium of goods and money markets
implies ect(= ec00t ) = y, mt = p(θet )−1 for all t. (27)
Function p(·) is determined so that the household’s demand for goods and money
always satisfies (27). Substituting (27) into (26) yields a condition that must be
satisfied for all possible values of θe,
ρ+ π(θe) = θeΠ(θe)−1v0(p(h(θe))−1) + θe
¡
Π(θe)−1 − 1
¢
. (28)
The left hand side represents the cost of holding money: the utility loss from post-
poning consumption plus the capital loss caused by inflation. In the other side are
the expected benefits of holding money: the first term is the expected utility from
holding money, whereas the second term represents the expected capital gain by the
downward jump in the price level (the upward jump in the value of money) when
the liquidity shock occurs. Thus, (28) shows that function p(·) is determined so that
the cost and the benefit of holding money are equalized with each other.
From (17), (18) and (28), we obtain a (delay) diﬀerential equation for p(·):
p0(θe) =
p(θe)
g(θe)
π(θe), where
π(θe) ≡ −(ρ+ θe) + θe p(θ
e)
p(h(θe))
v0(p(h(θe))−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
.
(29)
Since functions u, v, g, h are already known, (29) is an autonomous diﬀerential equa-
tion with respect to function p(·). The following lemma gives a boundary condition
with which function p(·) is pinned down.
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(a) The shape of function P (θe)
(b) Evolution of inflation rate
Figure 2: Inflation cycles without nominal frictions
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2 and transversality condition12
lim
T→∞
Ete
−ρ(T−t)u0(cT )mT = 0 for all t, (30)
function π(·) must satisfy limθe→θ∗ π(θe) = 0.
proof: in appendix
Intuitively, the inflation rate at the limit (θet → θ∗) must be must be equalized to
the growth rate of nominal money supply, which is zero in our model. Note that
there exists a non-zero possibility that the liquidity shock does not occur for an
arbitrary long time. In that case, if limθe→θ∗ π(θe) 6= 0, the real money holding
mt = p
−1
t diverges to either infinity (violating the transversality condition) or to zero
(violating the assumption of the monetary equilibrium).
The stationary dynamics of a monetary equilibrium can be calculated from (29)
and the boundary condition given by Lemma 1. Figure 2(a) shows the representative
shape of function p(·) against θe, which is downward sloping.13 A large value of θet
means that people anticipates that the liquidity shock occurs with a high probability.
In that situation, the marginal benefit of holding money is high. Thus, to clear the
market for money, the value of money must be suﬃciently high in relative to the
value of good, which means a low price level.
During the period without the liquidity shock, θet gradually declines and pt in-
creases. Figure 2(b) shows the evolution of inflation rate against time as θet moves
12Operator Et represents the expectation based on the information available to agents at date t.
13In all examples presented in this paper, we specify u(c) = ln c, v(m) = −m−1, y = 1, ρ = .05,
θH = 1, θL = .2, pH = .05 and pL = .02. We have confirmed that our results are robust to changes
in parameter values.
12
from θH to θ∗. Inflation accelerates temporarily when the households adjusts their
belief responding to observing no shock for a certain time length, but it gradually
falls to the rate of nominal money growth, which is zero in this case, as the economy
converges to the most optimistic state. When the liquidity shock occurs, θet jumps
up. Then pt jumps down so that the (θet , pt) pair is always on the curve depicted in
panel (a). Thus, the dynamics of the economy is characterized by gradual inflation
with sporadic and discrete falls in the price level.
At each event of the liquidity shock, price level must jump down in order to clear
the increased liquidity demand induced by the change in people’s belief. However,
we rarely observe such a discrete fall in the price level in the aggregate economy;
although we do sometimes observe a discrete fall in the prices of certain goods, the
aggregated general price level tends to fall only slowly. One explanation for this is the
existence of a (downward) nominal stickiness in the price level caused by staggered
price adjustments, menu costs, labor unions, moral issues, and the all other factors
discussed in the literature. If the price cannot jump downward, our model predicts
that the demand for money exceeds the supply, and, by Warlas’ law, a demand
shortage occurs in the goods and labor market. The next section investigates this
possibility.
5 Possibility of Depression under Sticky Prices
The discrete fall in the price level derived in the previous section implies that the
instantaneous rate of inflation must be minus infinity. This section considers a more
realistic setting where the price level cannot fall infinitely fast, or equivalently, where
the rate of deflation is restricted to be within some finite bound.14 Let us consider a
model similar to the one analyzed in the previous section, with a only diﬀerence in
14This is equivalent to assuming that the nominal wage cannot fall infinitely fast because the
production technology is linear and firms are competitive.
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that the price level cannot fall faster than a certain rate,15
p˙t/pt ≥ −δ, δ ∈ (0,∞). (31)
Note that condition (31) breaks the one-for-one relationship between the price level
and the belief because pt cannot jump while θet can. Thus, the state of the economy
cannot be described solely by θet ; but by the pair of (θet , pt). This economy has two
possibilities at each point in time. The first possibility is that constraint (31) is not
binding and full employment obtains (nt = 1 and ct = y). The second possibility
is that (31) is binding, i.e., p˙t/pt = −δ, and unemployment exists (nt < 1 and
ct < y). Which one of these possibilities occurs depends on the state of the economy,
summarized by (θet , pt).
It is natural to guess that, for a given level of θet , there is a level of pt at which
the money market clears and full employment obtains. Let us denote this critical
level by p(θet ). Price level pt cannot be below the threshold p(θe) since there is no
upward stickiness in the price level and thus can be adjusted instantly if pt < p(θe).
Similarly to the previous section, we limit our attention to the monetary equilibrium
path by assuming that16
Assumption 3 p(θe) ∈ (0,∞) for all θe ∈ (θ∗, θH).
Unemployment occurs when constraint (31) is binding, i.e., when p > p(θe). In
this case, the economy experience deflation at the rate of δ. If (31) is not binding,
full employment obtains and the price level evolves so that equilibrium condition
p = p(θe) is maintained. Let us denote by C(θe, p) aggregate demand for goods at
state (θe, p). Then,
C(θe, p)
(
= y if p = p(θe),
< y if p > p(θe).
(32)
15To keep the analysis to follow as tractable as possible, we employ a quite simple specification
for the sticky price in condition (31). This assumption is motivated by the experience in Japan,
where the rate of deflation remained at a few percentage points for nearly ten years after mid 1990s.
When we explicitly model a staggered pricing behavior by monopolistically competing firms, the
rate of deflation would diﬀer depending on the state of economy. Nonetheless, the most of the main
implications will not change because the most crucial assumption is that the price cannot jump.
We could also assume a symmetric restriction such as p˙t/pt ∈ [−δ, δ]. This would make the analysis
a little complicated without changing the final results.
16We can show that if there is some θ∞ ∈ (θ∗, θH) such that p(θ∞) =∞ then pt =∞ for all t.
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The inflation rate for a given state can be summarized as
π(θe, p) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p0(θe)
p(θe)
g(θe) if p = p(θe),
− δ if p > p(θe).
(33)
The representative household maximize (1) under budget constraint (2). Since
the demand for goods is C(θet , pt) and the production function is ynt, the amount
of employment is determied as nt = C(θet , pt)/y. The budget constraint can thus be
written as
m˙t = C(θet , pt)− π(θet , pt)mt + ct (34)
as long as pt evolves continuously, and as (20) if pt jumps. Note that, from (31),
price level pt never jumps down. At this point, however, we cannot rule out an
upward jump in pt, which may occur if current price level pt is smaller than the
new market clearing price level after the shock, p(h(θet )). Let us denote the value
function of the household by U(θe, p,m), which now depends on the current value
of p because it aﬀects the aggregate demand and thus the household’s income. The
Bellman equation for this problem is
U(θe, p,m) = max
c
h
u(c)∆t+ (θe∆t)v(m00)
+
1
1 + ρ∆t
©
(1− θe∆t)U(θe0, p0,m0) + (θe∆t)U(h(θe), p00,m00)
ªi
,
(35)
where θe0 = θe+g(θe)∆t, p0 = p+π(θe, p)p∆t, m0 = m+(C(θe, p)−π(θe, p)m+c)∆t,
p00 = max{p(h(θ)), p}, and m00 = (p/p00)m. Taking the limit of ∆t→ 0 in (35) yields
the HJB equation,
ρU =max
c
h
u(c) + θe
¡
v(m00) + U(h(θe), p00,m00)− U
¢
+ g(θe)Uθ
+ π(θe, p)pUp +
¡
C(θe, p)− π(θe, p)m− c
¢
Um
i
,
(36)
where the arguments of function U(·, ·, ·) and its partial derivatives are abbreviated
when they are (θe, p,m). The first order condition for (36) is u0(ec) = Um(θe, p,m),
where ec is the optimal amount of consumption. Then, the envelope condition is
(ρ+ π(θe, p) + θe)Um =θe(p/p00)
¡
v0(m00) + Um(h(θe), p00,m00)
¢
+ g(θe)Uθm
+ π(θe, p)pUpm +
¡
C(θ, p)− π(θe, p)m− ec¢Umm. (37)
Note that the RHS of (37) depends on whether p jumps or not in the event of the
liquidity shock. As long as function p(·) is weakly downward sloping, p ≥ p(θe) ≥
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p(h(θe)) and therefore p00 = p and m00 = m. The following analysis focuses on this
case and we leave for Appendix the analysis of the case of p < p(h(θe)).
Substituting the first order condition, its time derivative, and the conditions for
the representative household, ec = C(θe, p) and m = p−1, into (37) yields the Euler
equation,Ã
ρ−
d
dt
u0(C(θe, p))
u0(C(θe, p))
!
+ π(θe, p) = θe
v0(p−1)
u0(C(θe, p))
+ θe
µ
u0(C(h(θe), p))
u0(C(θe, p))
− 1
¶
(38)
for all t /∈ S(0,∞). Equation (38) has an interpretation similar to (28). The cost of
holding money, given by the LHS, is the sum of time preference and inflation. The
benefit is the sum of the direct utility gain and the expected capital gain measured
in terms of utility when a shock occurs and consumption jumps down.
Functions p(·) and C(·, ·) are determined so that equation (38) holds for all pos-
sible pairs of (θe, p). Let us first consider the case in which current price p is at
the market clearing level p(θe). Recall that p = p(θe) implies C(θe, p) = y and
π(θe, p) = p0(θe)g(θe)/p(θe) from (32) and (33). Substituting these for (38) gives a
diﬀerential equation that determines the form of function p(·):17
p0(θe) =
p(θe)
g(θ)
γp(θe), where
γp(θe) = −(ρ+ θe) + θe
v0 (p(θe)−1) + u0(C(h(θe), p(θe)))
u0(y)
.
(39)
Function γp(θe) in (39) represents the growth (inflation) rate of the market clearing
price, p˙t/pt. The diﬀerence between (29) and (39) lies in the fact that consumption
is adjusted in the occurrence of the liquidity shock when nominal stickiness exists,
while adjustment is done fully by the price level when price is completely flexible. A
boundary condition for equation (39) is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 3 and transversality condition (30), function γp(·)
must satisfy limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) = 0
proof: in appendix
Next, consider the case in which current price p is above the market clearing level
p(θe). In this case, p > p(θe) implies C(θe, p) < y and π(θe, p) = −δ. Substituting
17Equation (39) holds when p ≥ p(h(θe)). The corresponding expression for γp(θe) when p <
p(h(θe)) is given by (44) in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Representative shapes of function C(θe, p) and function p(θe)
this for (38) gives a partial (delay) diﬀerential equation for function C(·, ·),
g(θe)Cθ(θe, p)− pδCp(θe, p) =
u0(C(θe, p))
u00(C(θe, p))
γu0(θe, p), where
γu0(θe, p) = ρ− δ + θe − θe
v0 (p−1) + u0(C(h(θe), p))
u0(C(θe, p))
.
(40)
In (40), γu0(θe, p) represents the rate of change in marginal utility, u˙0/u0. Combined
with the boundary condition C(θe, p(θe)) = y for all θe, this partial (delay) diﬀerential
equation determines the shape of function C(·, ·) for all (θe, p) ∈ {(θe, p)|p > p(θe))}.
5.1 Numerical Analysis
Since p(·) and C(·, ·) are interrelated as described above, they are determined si-
multaneously so that they satisfy the system of partial diﬀerential equations, (39)
and (40), along with two boundary conditions specified above. This problem can
be solved numerically by combining a finite diﬀerence method and an appropraite
iteration method.18 Figure 3 shows a representative shape of function C(·, ·) in
18The details of the simulation procedure are availble upon request.
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(a) phase diagram in (θe, p) space (b) phase diagram in (c, p) space
Figure 4: Evolution of the economy during the period of no shock.
(θe, p) space, where the solid curve on the edge represents function p(·). Observe
that function p(·) is downward sloping in θe. The reason behind it is the same as
the reason for the similar property of p(·) in the previous section: when θe is large,
people’s liquidity preference is high and thus a low price level (a high relative price
of money to goods) is required to equalize the money demand to the money supply.
The height of curved surface indicates the value of function C(θe, p) at each state in
region p > p(θe). C(θe, p) is equal to y on the curve of p = p(θe) and gets smaller
as the pair (θe, p) moves to the direction of north-east. That is, a pair of high θet
and high pt implies a combination of high liquidity preference, a low relative price
of money to goods, and a small supply of real money stock. In that case, the excess
demand for money is huge and therefore the aggregate demand for goods (and thus
employment) is small.
Figure 4 illustrates the movement of the belief, price and consumption (output)
during the period of no shock. For ease of visibility, we present two phase diagrams
in (θe, p) spece and in (c, p) space. If the current price level pt is higher than the
market clearing price level p(θet ), the price gradually falls and consumption (output)
grows according to
p˙t
pt
= −δ, c˙t =
u0(ct)
u00(ct)
"
ρ− δ + θe − θet
v0
¡
p−1t
¢
+ u0(c00t )
u0(ct)
#
, (41)
where c00t ≡ C(h(θe), pt).19 As long as no shock occurs, the pair (θe, pt) follows (41)
until it reaches the market clearing curve pt = p(θet ) in a finite time. From that time
19The second equation in (41) is obtained by solving ddtu
0(ct)/u0(ct) = γu0(θe, p), where γu0(θe, p)
is given by (40). Similarly, the first equation in (42) is given by γp(θe, p) in (39).
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on, consumption stays constant and the price level rises so that the pair traces the
market clearing curve,
p˙t
pt
= −(ρ+ θet ) + θet
v0(p−1t ) + u
0(c00t )
u0(y)
, ct = y. (42)
As θe approaches θ∗, the price level converges to p∗ ≡ p(θ∗), and inflation rate
converges to zero.
Now let us explain how the economy reacts to the liquidity shocks. In this
model, the reaction is both qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent depending on
the history and the way the economy is hit by the shocks. To illustrate this point,
the following consider three diﬀerent examples. Figure 5(a) presents the result from
a standard impulse-response exercise. In this exercise, it is assumed that there have
been no shock for a long time and then the economy is hit by a one-shot liquidity
shock. Before the shock, the household has the lowest possible belief θe = θ∗ and
the price level is at the highest, pt = p(θ∗). At the time of the liquidity shock, the
household updates its belief θe to h(θ∗), but pt cannot jump immediately. Thus, as
illustrated in the left panel, the pair (θe, pt) jumps horizontally toward east. This
means that the pair is now above the market clearing line (pt = p(θet )), and therefore
consumption and output must fall discretely (see the right panel). After the shock,
both θe and pt gradually falls through learning and deflation. This means that the
pair (θe, pt) approaches the market clearing curve, and accordingly consumption and
output recover toward the initial level.
As a second example, Figure 5(b) illustrates a situation where the economy is
hit regularly by shocks. Observe that, when compared to the case where the shock
occurs only once, consumption falls only slightly each time the economy is hit by
a shock, and that the recovery after the fall is fairly quick. There are two reasons
behind this counter-intuitive result. When shocks occur regularly, the belief of the
household is always near the highest level, θH . That is, the household believes almost
surely that the economy is in the dangerous state (state H), and will not change its
belief much when another shock is observed. In addition, the price level is already
adjusted to this belief and near the lowest level p(θH). Thus, even when θet jumps,
the price need not fall significantly. As a result, the recovery process is quick.
Figure 5(c) displays the worst possibility as the third example. Similarly to
example (a), we assume that there have been no shock for a long time before the
economy is hit by a shock (this implies that the economy is initially at θe = θ∗ and
pt = p(θ∗)). However, in this example, the shock is not one-shot, but comes in a
bunch for a short while. By observing the shocks, the belief θet jumps up again and
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5: Reaction of the economy to liquidity shocks: three examples
again nearly to the highest level θH , while giving little time for the price level to
adjust through deflation. As a result, the pair (θe, pt) moves to the furthiest position
from the market clearling curve, and consumption (outout) falls nearly to the lowest
possible value (cmin). In addition, even after the shock ceases, the recovery process is
slow; it can be seen from the figure that the time path of ct is convex in the phase of
recovery. This is because once the household hold a strong belief that the underlying
state is bad (i.e., θet ≈ θH), the belief cannot be easily overturned by the additional
information that no shock is observed for a while.20 In other words, once agents
become too pessimistic, it takes a long time until the recovery process accerelates.
20Recall the discussion in the end of section 3.
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(a) actual shock probability θt (dashed line) and belief θet .
(b) actual price level pt (dashed curve) and market clearing price pt
(c) consumption ct
Figure 6: A simulated time path when shock are generated by Markov modulated
Poisson process
This pattern of recovery is in contrast to example (a), where the shock is observed
only once and may be viewed as a “mere accidient.” (Observe that the time path of
ct during the recovery process is actually concave in example (a)).
So far, we considered three examples where the shocks occur in specific patterns.
However, in the actual model economy, the shocks are randomly generated by the
Markov modulated Poisson process, as explained in Section 3. Figure 6 which depicts
a simulated time path of the economy when shocks are randomly generated. Observe
that the price level goes up when the economy stay in the safer fundamental state
(state L) for some time. This is in fact dangerous because once the state switches
to state H, where many shocks are likely to occur, the market clearing price (pt)
jumps down to a lower level, but the actual price (pt) can only fall gradually. This
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creates a large discrepancy between pt and pt, which translates into a period of
stagnation where consumption ct and thus output stay below the normal level. This
mechanism provides one possible reasion why once a long-time (seemingly) stable
economy experiences negative shocks it has to go through a long and deflationary
period of depression.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of economic fluctuations and prolonged depression based
on households’ learning behavior. We consider a stochasic version of Money-in-
Utility model, where agents recieve utility from money only when liquidity shocks
occur, where the true shock probability unobservably changes between high and
low. In this setting, we first exmained the way the households update thier belief
through Bayesian learning. Second, using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, we
investigated the evolutions of consumption and money holding of the household who
behaves rationally based on his belief about the state of the economy. Third, we
derived a stationary cycle under perfect price adjustments in terms of a delay dif-
ferential equation and demonstrated that the price level would experience sporadic
downward jumps in such a setting. Forth, we extended the model to incorporate
nominal stickiness. In this case, the belief and the slow-moving price cannot corre-
spond one-to-one, and this discrepancy creates a period of stagnation. The stationary
dynamics is given as a solution to a system of partial delay diﬀerential equations,
which we solved numerically. It is shown that the reaction of the economy to negative
shocks depends on the history and the pattern of the realization of the shocks. In
particular, a successive occurrence of shocks may cause a depression if the economy
has enjoyed a long period of stability before encountering the shocks.
Appendix
A Analysis of the case of p < p(h(θe))
If pt < p(h(θet )), p00 = p(h(θeT )) and m
00 = mp/p(h(θet )) in (35), (36) and (37). Substi-
tuting the first order condition, its time derivative, and the equilibrium conditions,
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ec = C(θe, p) and m = p−1, into (37) yields the Euler equation,Ã
ρ−
d
dt
u0(C(θe, p))
u0(C(θe, p))
!
+ π(θe, p)
= θe
p
p(h(θe))
v0(p(h(θe))−1)
u0(C(θe, p))
+ θe
µ
p
p(h(θe))
u0(y)
u0(C(θe, p))
− 1
¶ (43)
for all t /∈ S(0,∞). Substituting p = p(θe), C(θe, p) = y and π(θe, p) = p0(θe)g(θe)/p(θe),
from (32) and (33), for (43) gives the growth rate of pt during the period of full em-
ployment:
γp(θe) = −(ρ+ θe) + θe
p(θe)
p(h(θe))
v0 (p(h(θe))−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
. (44)
When unemployment exists (i.e., p ≥ p(θe)), the rate of change in marginal utility is
obtained by substituting π(θe, p) = −δ for (43),
γu0(θe, p) = ρ− δ + θe + θe
p
p(h(θe))
v0 (p−1) + u0(y)
u0(C(θe, p))
. (45)
B Proof of Lemmas
Let θnst,T , c
ns
t,T , p
ns
t,T and m
ns
t,T denote respectively the values of θT , cT , pT and mT
conditional on that no shock occurs between t and T . Then, the probability that no
shock occurs between t and T is given by exp
³
−
R T
t
θnst dτ
´
.
The transversality condition (TVC) can be written as limT→∞EtVt,T = 0, where
Vt,T ≡ e−ρ(T−t)u0(cT )mT and Et denotes the expectation taken upon the information
available at t. Since u0(cT )mT ≥ 0 for all T ,
EtVt,T ≥ exp
µ
−
Z T
t
θnst dτ
¶
e−ρ(T−t)u0(cnst,T )mt,T ≡ V nst,T . (46)
Note that while Vt,T is a random variable, V
ns
t,T is a deterministic variable given the
information available at t. From (46), a necessary condition for the TVC is
lim
T→∞
V nst,T ≤ 0. (47)
Diﬀerentiating (46) with respect to T and using equilibrium condition mnst,T = 1/pnst,T
yield
dV nst,T /dT
V nst,T
= −θnst,T − ρ+
du0(cnst,T )/dT
u0(cnst,T )
− dp
ns
t,T/dT
pnst,T
. (48)
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Lemma 1
Without nominal stickiness, cnst,T = y for all T and thus du
0(cnst,T )/dT = 0. From (29),
(dpnst,T/dT )/p
ns
t,T = π(θnsT ). Substituting these into (48) yields
dV nst,T
dT
= −θnst,T
p(θnst,T )
p(h(θnst,T ))
v0(p(h(θnst,T ))
−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
V nst,T . (49)
Using p(θnst,T ) = p
ns
t,T = 1/m
ns
t,T and the definition of V
ns
t,T in (46), equation (49) reduces
to dV nst,T /dT = − exp(−
R T
t
ρ+θnst,v dv)θnst,TZ(h(θ
ns
t,T )), where Z(θ) ≡ (v0(p(θ)−1) + u0(y)) /p(θ).
Integrating this diﬀerential equation with respect to T from t to ∞ and using the
fact that V nst,t = u
0(y)mt give
lim
T→∞
V nst,T = u
0(y)mt −
Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z T
t
ρ+ θnst,v dv
¶
θnst,TZ(h(θ
ns
t,T )) dT. (50)
Fix a small constant a > 0 and define a closed interval A ≡ [h(θ∗), h(θ∗ + a)] ∈
(θ∗, θH). Note that Assumption 2 implies that Z(θ) ∈ (0,∞) for all θ ∈ (θ∗, θH).
In addition, it is continuous in this interval because (29) implies that p(·) is dif-
ferentiable. Thus, there exist finite constants Zmin ≡ minθ∈A Z(θ) ∈ (0, 1) and
Zmax ≡ maxθ∈A Z(θ) ∈ (0, 1). Whenever θet ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a), θnst,T ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a) for all
T ≥ t. and therefore there is upper and lower bounds for the second term in the
RHS of (50), given byµ
θ∗Zmin
ρ+ θ∗ + a
,
(θ∗ + a)Zmax
ρ+ θ∗
¶
≡ (Imin, Imax) ⊂ (0,∞). (51)
Now suppose that limθe→θ∗ π(θe) < 0. Then as θet converges to θ∗, pt → 0 and
therefore mt → ∞. However, this violates the TVC since conditions (47), (50) and
(51) imply that the TVC requires mt ≤ Imax/u0(y) whenever θet ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a).
Suppose conversely that limθe→θ∗ π(θe) < 0. Then as θet converges to θ∗, pt →∞
and thereforemt → 0. For suﬃciently smallmt, (50) and (51) imply limT→∞ V nst,T < 0.
Since V nst,t = u
0(ct)mt > 0 and V nst,T is continuous in T , there should be a value of T ≥ t
such that V nst,T = 0. From the definition of V
ns
t,T in (46) this implies that m
ns
t,T = 0 and
therefore p(θnst,T ) = pnst,T =∞, violating Assumption 2.
Lemma 2
We first derive a contradiction under assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0. Fix a > 0 and
define A = [h(θ∗), h(θ∗ + a)]. Then, from p(θ) ∈ (0,∞) and its continuity, there
exists pmin ≡ minθ∈A p(θ) ∈ (0,∞). The assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0 implies that
p(θ) → 0 as θ → θ∗. Recall, in addition, that pt falls at the rate of δ whenever
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pt > p(θ∗). Thus, there is a positive probability that (θet , pt) pair satisfies θet < θ∗+a
and pt ≤ pmin when the liquidity shock does not occur for a suﬃciently long while.
Suppose that the current (θet , pt) pair satisfies the above inequalities. Then
pnst,T < p(h(θ
ns
t,T )) for all T ≥ t, which means that the analysis in Appendix A applies.
Substituting the results obtained in Appendix A into (48) yields
dV nst,T /dT
V nst,T
=
(
− θnst,T − ρ+ γu0(θnst,T ) + δ if pnst,T > p(θnst,T ),
− θnst,T − ρ− γp(θnst,T ) if pnst,T = p(θnst,T ).
(52)
Substituting (44) and (45) into (52) and using pnst,T = 1/m
ns
t,T and the definition of
V nst,T in it, equation (52) reduces to dV
ns
t,T /dT = − exp(−
R T
t
ρ + θnst,v dv)θnst,TZ(h(θ
ns
t,T )),
where Z(θ) ≡ (v0(p(θ)−1) + u0(y)) /p(θ). Integrating this diﬀerential equation with
respect to T from t to ∞ and using the fact that V nst,t = u0(cnst,T )mt give
lim
T→∞
V nst,T = u
0(cnst,T )mt −
Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z T
t
ρ+ θnst,v dv
¶
θnst,TZ(h(θ
ns
t,T )) dT. (53)
Note that h(θnst,T ) ∈ A for all T ≥ t and that there exists a finite constant
Zmax ≡ maxθ∈A Z(θ). From cnst,T ≤ y, u0(cnst,T ) ≥ u0(y) for all T . Thus (47) and (53)
jointly imply that
mt ≤
(θ∗ + a)Zmax
(ρ+ θ∗)u0(y)
. (54)
While assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0 implies that an arbitrarily large mt = 1/pt
realizes with a positive probability, the RHS of (54) is constant. Thus (54) and
hence the TVC will be violated with a positive probability.
Next, assume conversely that limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) > 0, which means that p(θe) become
arbitrarily large as θe → θ∗. Then, θnst,T ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a) and pnst,T = p(θnst,T ) > pmax ≡
maxθ∈A p(θ) for suﬃciently large T . In this case, Analysis in Section 4 applies and
full employment obtains. From mnst,T = 1/p
ns
t,T and (39),
dmnst,T
dT
= (ρ+ θnst,T )m
ns
t,T − θnst,T
v0(mnst,T )m
ns
t,T + u
0(C(h(θnst,T ), 1/mnst,T ))mnst,T
u0(y)
(55)
for suﬃciently large T . As T → ∞, p(θnst,T ) → ∞ and therefore mnst,T → 0. In
this case, (55) implies limT→∞ dmnst,T/dT < θ
ns
T u
0(y)−1 limm→0 v0(m)m < 0, where the
latter inequality follows from the definition of v(·). These properties jointly imply
that there is a finite T such that mnst,T = 0 and therefore p(θ
ns
t,T ) = p
ns
t,T =∞, violating
Assumption 3.
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